SECURITY SUBCULTURES IN AN ORGANIZATION - EXPLORING VALUE CONFLICTS by Kolkowska, Ella
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ECIS 2011 Proceedings European Conference on Information Systems(ECIS)
Summer 10-6-2011
SECURITY SUBCULTURES IN AN
ORGANIZATION - EXPLORING VALUE
CONFLICTS
Ella Kolkowska
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2011
This material is brought to you by the European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ECIS 2011 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Kolkowska, Ella, "SECURITY SUBCULTURES IN AN ORGANIZATION - EXPLORING VALUE CONFLICTS" (2011). ECIS
2011 Proceedings. 237.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2011/237
SECURITY SUBCULTURES IN AN ORGANIZATION - 
EXPLORING VALUE CONFLICTS 
Kolkowska, Ella, Swedish Business School at Örebro University, Fakultetsgatan 1, 701 82 
Örebro, Sweden, ella.kolkowska@oru.se 
Abstract  
Security culture is considered as an important factor in overcoming the problem with employees’ lack 
of compliance with Information Security (IS) policies. Within one organization different subcultures 
might transcribe to different and sometimes even conflicting, values. In this paper we study such value 
conflicts and their implications on IS management and practice. Shein’s (1999) model of 
organizational culture is used as a tool supporting analysis of our empirical data. We found that 
value conflicts exists between different security cultures within the same organization and that users 
anchor their values related to IS in their professional values. Thus our empirical results highlight 
value conflicts as an important factor to take into account when security culture is developed in an 
organization. Moreover, we found Shein’s model as a useful tool for analysis of value conflicts 
between different subcultures in an organization.  
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1 Introduction 
The information security (IS) literature shows that a majority of security incidents are caused by 
trusted personnel within organizations who intentionally or unintentionally violate IS policies (Vroom 
and von Solms 2004; PWC 2008; Whitman and Mattord 2008). Hence, creating work environments 
where employees‟ comply with the organization‟s IS policies is a key issue in the management of IS 
today (PWC 2008). According to the literature such environments can be established by changing the 
organisational culture and creating an IS culture where “proper” security behaviour is a natural part of 
the employees‟ daily work activities (Leach 2003; Thomson, von Solms et al. 2006; Knapp, Marshall 
et al. 2007). There are two assumptions in current research of security culture. The first is that 
employees are able to internalize IS values in their daily work practices (Thomson 2009). Based on 
this assumption a majority of current studies of security cultures focus on changing employees‟ basic 
assumptions and beliefs to align them with values implemented in IS policies (Vroom and von Solms 
2004; Thomson, von Solms et al. 2006). The second assumption is that an organization‟s security 
culture can be treated as a monolithic culture (Ramachandran, Rao et al. 2008). However, these 
assumptions may be questioned.  
Firstly, various studies show that users and managers have different views and experience of IS values 
and practices. These differences result in a lack of understanding for the other‟s point of view and 
lead to security approaches that are poorly aligned with the users‟ working situation (Albrechtsen and 
Hovden 2009; Kolkowska 2009). Therefore it might be difficult to align employees‟ values with 
values espoused in IS policies. Secondly, researchers in organizational culture emphasize that 
organizational culture may vary across different groups within organizations (Jermier, Slocum et al. 
1991). Analogously, the security culture of an organization may vary across different groups such as 
managers, IT-professionals and employees within one organization. In this paper we make a call for 
better understanding of different IS values and cultures coexisting within an organization. 
Organizational IS policies are expressions of management‟s values and beliefs anchored in their 
profession (von Solms and von Solms 2004) while employees‟ behaviors might be anchored in other 
values and beliefs. These different values might come in conflict with each other influencing IS 
management and practice (Kolkowska 2009). According to organizational literature, failing to pay 
attention to value conflicts can lead to dysfunction within the whole organization (Dhillon 2007; Vast 
2007; Guzman, Stam et al. 2008). Thus, the purpose of this paper is to understand value conflicts 
between different subcultures in an organization and their implications on IS management and 
practice. Shein‟s (1999) model of organizational culture is used for analysis of values and value 
conflicts held in the different professional subcultures. This model has earlier been used successfully 
in various studies conceptualizing security culture (Vroom and von Solms 2004; Thomson 2009; Da 
Veiga and Eloff 2010). 
2 Information security culture 
Today, IS is viewed in a socio-organizational perspective and the literature in this field emphasizes 
that the behaviors of employees, their values and beliefs have to be addressed in order to protect the 
information assets of an organization (Siponen 2005; Mishra and Dhillon 2006; Dhillon 2007). 
Various scholars (Leach 2003; Thomson, von Solms et al. 2006) recognize that an organization‟s 
security culture might be an important factor in maintaining an adequate level of IS in an 
organization, and argue that cultivating a security culture will establish „proper‟ security related 
behaviors into the day-to-day activities of the employees.  
Security culture is defined as „the totality of patterns of behaviour that come together to ensure 
protection of information resources of an organization‟ (Dhillon 2007 p 221). The research on security 
culture can, at least, be divided into two categories: studies that propose dimensions of security 
culture based on frameworks from management and industrial psychology, and conceptualizations of 
security culture to existing models of culture (e.g Shein‟s (1999) model). 
In the first category scholars (e.g. Chia, Maynard et al. 2002; Dhillon 2007; Ruighaver, Maynard et al. 
2007) have used theory-based approaches based on Detert (2000) or Hall‟s (1959) taxonomies to 
propose dimensions for security culture. The proposed dimensions are only partially similar in all the 
studies indicating that the understanding of security culture is still evolving.  
In the second category, a number of studies use existing models of organizational culture for 
conceptualizations of security culture. Schein‟s (1999) three level model of organizational culture is 
widely used for this purpose within the IS field. For example, Schleinger and Teufel (2003) adopt this 
model and give examples of security issues for each level of the model. Based on the same model, 
Vroom and von Solms (2004) and Thompson (2009) suggest how the organizational culture can be 
transformed into a security aware culture. Furthermore, Furnell and Thomson (2009) use the model to 
classify users‟ acceptance of IT security and DaVeiga and Eloff (2010) use the model as a starting 
point for their framework for cultivating IS culture within an organization. The common assumption 
in these studies is that employees‟ security behaviors and values should be changed so that they 
comply with organizational security policies and rules.  
Ruighaver and Maynard et al. (2007), as well as Ramachandran and Rao et al (2008), stress that most 
of the studies of security culture have limited focus on end-user beliefs and behaviors without 
consideration of contextual factors. They argue that in the context of IS management many different 
actors and values are involved. These different collaborating and communicating actors, such as IT-
technicians, management and users may transcribe to different values in design, implementation and 
use of IS measures. Therefore, the understanding of what constitutes a working security culture might 
differ between different groups within one organisation.  
This supposition is in line with organizational research, where various scholars argue that culture 
within an organization is not monolithic but consists of different subcultures (Boisnier and Chatman 
2002). These subcultures are usually formed around existing divisions, departments, functional or 
professional groups (Trice and Beyer 1993) and they can supplement or conflict with each other 
(Martin and Siehl 1983). Ramachandran and Rao et al. (2008) argue that to analyze security cultures 
in the context of the whole organization might be misleading because there might be significant 
differences in security cultures across different groups. They further argue that it is important to 
consider different professional groups in the analysis of the security culture of an organization 
because employees‟ behaviors are strongly influenced by the cultural beliefs of the profession that 
they belong to (Trice and Beyer 1993; Karahanna, Evaristo et al. 2005). It has for instance been 
argued that IT professionals who are often responsible for security issues in an organization belong to 
a distinct professional culture (Vast 2007; Guzman, Stam et al. 2008).  
In summary, literature in the area of security shows that a majority of research on IS culture has a 
limited end-user perspective. This limited focus is based on the belief that the establishment of a 
security culture is possible simply by changing the employees‟ basic assumptions and beliefs in 
accordance with the values implemented in IS policies. Additionally, most studies examine security 
culture in the context of an organization without considering the complexity of IS management in 
organizations where different groups and collaborating actors transcribe to different and sometimes 
even conflicting, values. Our study addresses this gap and focuses on value conflicts based on a belief 
that the implementation of a successful IS involves the negotiation of different values existing in 
different subcultures within one organization.  
3 Theory and methodology 
In this section we present the theory and methodology used in the conduct of the research.  
3.1 Conceptualizing Security Culture 
Value conflicts in this study are studied based on Shein‟s model of organisational culture (Schein 
1999). The main purpose of Shein‟s (1999) model is to increase understanding about the values that 
drive peoples‟ behaviours in an organization. Schein (1999) suggests that studies of culture should be 
made on three levels: (1) artefacts, (2) espoused values, and (3) basic assumptions (see figure 1).  
 Figure 1.  Shein’s model of organizational culture (Schein 1999). 
Artifacts are tangible visible behaviours, which include organisational practices and structures, i.e., 
what really happens in the organization (Schein 1999). In the context of IS, this level is related to 
implemented security measures and processes (Vroom and von Solms 2004; Thomson 2009) and also 
to employees‟ security behaviours. Artifacts are related to „how things are done‟ in an organisation. 
Espoused values relate to values and norms expressed within an organisation. These espoused values 
and norms might be formalized in different documents, but they can also exist informally. In relation 
to IS, espoused values can be found in IS strategy, policy, and guidelines (Vroom and von Solms 
2004) and they can also be expressed by people in the organisation. Espoused values are those values 
that people would mention if someone asks them what they consider as important in their work. 
Espoused values are related to the question „what is important in the organisation‟?   
Basic assumptions are the third and most hidden level of values in organizational culture. These 
assumptions are the basic underlying beliefs and values that are transferred to new members by the 
processes of socialisation. At this level, values are often unconscious. Basic assumptions directly 
impact the artefact level by deciding the observable behaviour of employees in their daily work 
activities (Schein 1999). Basic assumptions explain why people in an organization behave in a certain 
way. In the context of IS, basic assumptions explain the rationality behind implemented security 
structures and processes, as well as the rationality behind employees‟ security behaviours. Therefore 
basic assumptions are related to „why things in an organisation are done in this specific way‟. Because 
basic assumptions are hidden and unconscious, people can usually not express them clearly.  
Schein (1999) stresses that people do not always act according to what they say; in other words, their 
actions do not always fulfil their espoused values. For example people can express that cooperation is 
important in their work, but if we study how they work we find that they usually work behind closed 
doors and they do not exchange experiences or information. In other words there are no structures or 
processes that support the value of cooperation. This means that another value (an unconscious basic 
assumption) drive the processes. It is important to find basic assumptions to understand why people 
behave in certain way. Sometimes, the visible processes fulfil the espoused values and, in these cases, 
the espoused values can be said to explain people‟s behaviours and is the same as the underlying basic 
assumptions, but sometimes the visible processes do not comply with espoused values and this means 
that other values lie behind people‟s behaviours. Shein‟s model was chosen for this study because it 
makes it possible to distinguish between espoused values and basic assumptions. Such distinction is 
emphasized as important in the domain of IS because security actions in the real world might be 
different from the espoused values (e.g. Vroom and von Solms 2004; Ramachandran, Rao et al. 
2008). 
3.2 Research method 
The study was conducted as a qualitative case study (Benbasat, Goldstein et al. 1987; Myers 2009) at 
one of the Swedish universities. Various studies show that security threats and attacks against higher 
education institutions are growing (Marks 2007). At the same implementation of security measures 
are often more problematic in this environment than in other corporate environments (Drevin, Kruger 
et al. 2007).  
Data was collected through both interviews and documents at two departments. The two departments, 
that differed considerably concerning IS management and practice were chosen in consultation with 
the IS manager at the university. At each department we studied two subcultures: IT-professionals, 
who were responsible for management of IS at the departments, and users (faculty members) who 
were suppose to follow the implemented security rules. Our data collection was guided by the three 
levels in Shein‟s model to identify artifacts, espoused values and basic assumptions related to IS. We 
conducted semi-structured interviews based on the following questions: „how things are done here in 
relation to information handling‟ as a way to identify artifacts, and „what is important in work with IS 
in order to uncover the espoused values. Basic assumptions were derived from artifacts during the 
analysis. Policies, guidelines and work descriptions were studied at each department. Those 
documents were complemented with semi-structured interviews with IT-professionals and users. 
Lecturers, researchers and PhD students were selected, including both long-term employees as well as 
new staff members in order to achieve a comprehensive group of respondents. All in all twelve users 
were interviewed at department one, seven at department two, and four members of IT-professionals 
at each department. The number of respondents was not pre-determined, but we stopped the 
interviews when a saturation level was achieved. Each interview took between one and two hours and 
was recorded. The recorded interviews were transcribed in order to facilitate the analysis and to 
enable the values to be supported and demonstrated through citations.  
The data was analysed in four stages. Each department was analysed individually, meaning that we 
did not use the analysis from the first department as an input to the analysis at the second department. 
This was important to ensure the integrity of each case. The two departments were compared in the 
last stage of the analysis. In the first stage espoused security values for each group were identified 
based on the documents and interviews. The analysis resulted in a long list of statements, e.g., 
„Academic freedom is very important in my job‟, „sensitive data must be protected against 
disclosure‟. The statements were then categorized in clusters dealing with a similar issue. Thereafter 
clusters of values were labelled. The initial clusters were refined, renamed, and reanalyzed several 
times. The emerging clusters were validated through discussions with other researchers during several 
seminars and also through two meetings with the IS manager at the university. Espoused values for 
each subculture were analyzed in the same way but separately. During the second stage, structures 
and processes as well as security behaviours (artefacts) at each department were analysed in order to 
identify basic assumptions. Some basic assumptions could be found in the collected data, when the 
interviewees explained the reasons behind the behaviours, however most of basic assumptions were 
derived by the researches from the identified structures, and processes (artifacts) using  Kluckhohn‟s 
(1951) recommendation of identifying values from actions and words. According to the Kluckhohn 
(1951) values are exposed in: 1) actions or words that express approval or disapproval, and 2) actions 
intending to achieve a certain goal or result. The identified basic assumptions were then categorised in 
the same way as espoused values (stage 1). In stage three, value conflicts at each department were 
identified. Firstly espoused values and basic assumptions per each subculture were compared to find 
value conflicts (vertical comparison in Shein‟s model). Secondly espoused values as well as basic 
assumptions were compared between the two groups at each department (horizontal comparison in 
Shein‟s model). In the last and fourth stage, value conflicts identified at the two departments were 
compared in order to find similarities and differences between the two departments. 
4 Value conflicts in the university’s security culture  
This section presents value conflicts found in the case study. The findings from the two departments 
are presented separately. The analysis of value conflicts are based on artifacts, espoused values and 
basic assumptions identified at each department.  
4.1 Value conflicts identified at department 1  
A number of value conflicts were identified at department one. Generally both users and IT-
professionals espouse similar values in relation to IS; therefore we did not find any value conflict on 
this level. The conflicts were found between basic assumptions held by IT-professionals and users and 
also between IT-professionals‟ espoused values and their basic assumptions. The two categories of 
conflicts are presented below.  
Conflict 1: different assumptions about responsibility  
Both IT-professionals and users emphasized the value of responsibility as important in work with IS 
at the department; however their basic assumptions about this value were different. IT-professionals 
advocated that user need to be active and take responsibility for protecting information, finding IS 
information, looking for relevant rules and guidelines and so on. IT-professionals argued: „it is a part 
of the culture that people look for the information by themselves‟, and „as users know best what 
information that is sensitive at their computers they should be responsible for protecting it‟. Users on 
the other hand considered IT-professionals responsible for protecting networks and information at the 
department, and also for providing users with relevant information about IS. Users also thought that it 
was the responsibility of the IT-professionals to increase IS awareness among users. The users 
stressed: „We are responsible for giving courses and carrying out our research but management has to 
supply us with the necessary information about the laws and regulations we have to follow‟, „IT 
security is the IT-department‟s issue. We don‟t know anything about security‟.  
Conflict 2: different assumptions about freedom  
Both IT-professionals and users emphasized the value of freedom as important in work with IS at the 
department, but they understood this value differently. IT-professionals supported freedom in an open 
and free IT-environment. The users at the department had maximized rights in the networks and on 
the computers and they could download and install software on their computers. IT-professionals 
argue that such a strategy support creativity and flexibility needed in the work in an academic 
environment. However, IT-professionals emphasized the value of freedom in relation to using the 
computer at work, „we have a lot of problems with the laptops because people use them as toys. It 
causes a lot of extra work for us and the computers are inefficient when there is a lot of rubbish on 
them.‟ They stressed that some private use of university‟s resources is allowed, but it should be 
restricted by ethical principles and general guidelines. Users on the other hand, seemed to believe that 
the freedom in using work recourses should not be limited „The boundaries between private life and 
work are diffuse here. It is common that people use work resources to do private things, but it is also 
common to use private resources to do work. I think that the only thing we should think about is not to 
disturb co-workers in their work‟.  
Conflict 3: different assumptions about protection of information  
Both users and IT-professionals stressed that it was important to protect information. Users 
emphasized the importance of protecting information and IT resources. They stressed that information 
assets should be effectively protected because information is the most important part of their job. „I 
am most scared that somebody could delete or change my information…I would be upset…most of 
my work exists in digital form and is saved on my computer so it would be impossible to get the 
information from my paper notes.‟  
IT professionals also emphasized the importance of protecting information and resources; however we 
did not find any visible processes or structures how they implemented this value. IT-professionals 
pointed out that sensitive information handled by IT should be handled according to the same rules as 
sensitive information that is handled manually and the users should be aware about them. They also 
stressed that users are responsible for confidential information handled on their computers and in their 
work. „If people know that they handle very sensitive information they should ensure the right 
security level, for example by cryptography. But it is not something we do generally‟. It was obvious 
that IT-professionals at department one consider protection of information to be users‟ responsibility; 
however they did not create any prerequisites for the users to take such responsibility. We did not find 
any responsibility descriptions clarifying users‟ responsibilities, or any guidelines explaining how 
users can protect their computers and information. There were no courses, brochures or other means 
aiming to increase users‟ IS awareness. Consequently we did not find any efforts from the IT-
professionals to help users protect information at the department.   
Conflict 4: protection of information (IT-professionals espoused values and basic assumptions)  
IT-professionals at department one espoused values of confidentiality and integrity, and stressed that 
it was important to protect information at the department. However, as described in the previous 
section we did not find any visible structures or processes (artifacts) supporting these values. In other 
words, basic assumptions lay behind structures and processes related to IS at the department. We 
found that basic assumptions held by IT-professionals were: that information handled at the 
department is not confidential and for that reason, there is very little risk of the information being a 
target for intentional or direct attacks. IT-professionals considered users to be capable to take care of 
IS issues in this environment and saw themselves as a resource in IS work, i.e., their role was to 
encourage users‟ initiatives related to IS and support users‟ attempts.  
4.2 Value conflicts identified at department 2  
We identified a number of value conflicts at department two. The conflicts were related to both 
espoused values and basic assumptions held by IT-professionals and users and also to IT-
professionals‟ espoused values and their basic assumptions. First we present value conflicts between 
basic assumptions and espoused values held by IT-professionals and then value conflicts between IT-
professionals and users.  
Conflict 1: management of information security 
Most of the espoused values expressed by IT-professionals at department two correspond to 
implemented structures and processes. However, we did not find any processes supporting the 
espoused values respect, dialogue, cooperation and communication. These four values were espoused 
by IT-professionals in relation to how management of IS should be carried out at the department. IT-
professionals emphasized the importance of respect, cooperation, communication and dialogue 
between IT-professionals and users in deciding IS solutions. IT-professionals also emphasized that 
their mission is to support users in their work and that security requirements should come from the 
organisation. However, we found that IS at the department was managed top-down. This meant that 
the IT-professionals “know best” what was important to do to ensure security and they also decided 
the security requirements without consulting the users. This view resulted in, users sometimes being 
forced to change their way of working due to implemented solutions and requirements. Users were 
considered the greatest barriers to an effective IS and consequently, the users had to be controlled and 
directed. Therefore the values visible in structures and processes related to IS were control, 
standardization and planning. 
Conflict 2: standardisation and control vs creativity and flexibility 
This conflict arose because IT-professionals and users espoused and held different values in relation 
to standardization, control, creativity and flexibility. IT-professionals advocated control and 
standardization of the IT environment in the department. This meant that users‟ rights in the networks 
were minimized and IT-professionals were responsible for all installations and changes, and that 
networks were systematically monitored. Standardization meant that computers were similar in terms 
of installed hardware and software. Standardization made support easier and more effective. It was 
also less expensive and less time-consuming. On the other hand, users emphasized the value 
flexibility and creativity in their work. Flexibility means that there is the potential for different 
solutions; changes can be implemented quickly, depending on users‟ needs. It was argued that 
different users have different software and hardware needs related to their education and research. 
Creativity meant the possibility to test and try new software that could improve the quality of the 
work. „In my work I have to download and test different software. It is unacceptable that we are not 
allowed to do it. The problem is even worse because we cannot get help from the IT personnel quickly 
enough‟.  
Conflicts 3: control vs freedom 
IT-professionals stated that the environment should be controlled and for that reasons users‟ rights in 
the networks had to be limited. Users on the other hand argued that they should have more freedom in 
the networks so they can carry out high quality work. Still users‟ rights in the department‟s networks 
were limited in order achieve control over the IT environment, and consequently users did not have 
administrative rights on their computers and were not allowed to install software by themselves. 
These restrictions irritated users and reduced the quality of their work, „because we do not have rights 
on the lab‟s computers, I had to skip the part of the lesson that needed administrative rights‟.  
Conflict 4: planning vs flexibility 
This conflict is related to IT professionals‟ and users‟ different ideas about values of planning and 
flexibility. IT professional stressed that users should better plan their work and their need for support. 
According to the IT professionals, this would make support more effective. „I think that they are able 
to plan their work! The whole organization is planned, for example the budget has to be planned, and 
students and courses and so on… so it should not be a problem to plan other tasks in a more detailed 
way either‟. The users, on the other hand, emphasized the need for flexibility. They state that it is not 
always possible to plan the work in detail because the work is flexible, creative and constantly 
changing. They explain that especially in relation to research project needs could change quickly and 
they need IT-professionals to help them with updates, installations, and purchases and so on. The 
problem at the department was that unplanned requests were not prioritized and this resulted in 
decreased availability to information and resources for some users.  
Conflict 5: technical perspective vs trust  
IT-professionals believed that users should have a passive role in relation to IS and that security can 
be achieved by implementing technical solutions and controls. „it is technical solutions that minimize 
security risks…awareness is maybe useful, but more for the reason that the users can recognize when 
a computer does not work properly or when something is strange…in that case they should contact 
us‟. Moreover, IT-professionals considered users to be the greatest threat for effective IS and 
consequently, the users had to be controlled and directed. Users on the other hand believed that they 
can improve IS because of their knowledge about computers and their high IS awareness. The users 
consider their knowledge and experience to be sufficient to carry out some IS related and computer 
related tasks. They believed that they should be less controlled and more trusted in the work with IS. 
„I think it is important with trust. The organization benefits a lot and people are treated with trust and 
respect. People have then more motivation to work and work better.‟ The users at the department did 
not feel that they were trusted, appreciated or respected for their knowledge. 
Conflict 6: Different assumptions about availability  
Both IT-professionals and users emphasized availability, but they had different basic assumptions 
regarding the scope of this value. IT professionals‟ efforts to ensure availability were mostly related to 
information and resources in the department‟s „secure network‟, as well as the standard set of 
software and hardware. Structures and processes aiming to achieve availability were related to efforts 
made to ensure a stable and trustworthy network. The consequence of this approach was that the 
network was closed and information resources were available only at the university. It was a problem 
for users, who often needed to access information from outside the university. „This work means an 
environment where people can exchange knowledge and experiences with both colleagues and 
students and other researchers around the world. Availability is important‟ 
Conflicts 7: different assumptions about users‟ involvement in information security 
This value conflict is related to different basic assumptions related to users‟ involvement with IS at 
the department. Top-down steering and the technical focus in working with IS at the department 
meant that decisions and security measures were implemented without dialogue with the users. Users 
stated that they should have the right to influence their work environment. They wanted to have an 
opportunity to influence the work environment by participating in decision making related to their 
work; for example, when an IS strategy is formulated and implemented. Users at the department felt 
ignored when decisions were made without their knowledge and participation. An IS strategy was 
implemented in the department without dialogue with the users and complaints made by users did not 
have any effect on the strategy and implemented security controls. This resulted in the development of 
a negative attitude towards implemented security controls. The users stressed: „The implemented IS 
strategy is not suitable for our work and not accepted among users. It was not discussed with us, but 
just implemented.‟ „We have collected all complaints and presented them to IT personnel, but they do 
not have time to change the implemented rules and/or to examine new possibilities.‟ 
4.3 Value conflicts identified at the university – a summary  
The table below (table 1) presents a summary of all value conflicts identified at the university. In the 
first column we see the department at which the conflict was identified. The second column describes 
the conflict. The third column shows what actor groups experienced the conflict (IT means IT-
professionals and U means users) and the last column shows what types of values that are in conflict 
(BA basic assumptions resp EV espoused values). 
 
Department Conflict Actors Values 
D1 
C1 Different assumptions about responsibility IT-U BA 
C2 Different assumptions about freedom IT-U BA 
C3 Different assumptions about protection of information IT-U BA 
C4 Protection of information IT Between EV-BA 
D2 
C1 Management of information security IT Between EV-BA 
C2 Standardisation and control vs creativity and flexibility IT-U Both EV and BA  
C3 Control vs freedom IT-U Both EV and BA 
C4 Planning vs flexibility IT-U Both EV and BA 
C5 Technical perspective vs trust  IT-U Both EV and BA 
C6 Different assumptions about availability IT-U BA 
C7 Different assumptions about users involvement in IS IT-U BA 
Table 1. Value conflicts identified at the university 
5 Discussion and contributions 
Based on our empirical results, we will highlight four findings. We would like to point out that the 
first three findings presented in this section are context-specific and related to this particular case 
study in an academic domain, thus the findings might be different from an industry setting. 
First we found that different groups emphasize different values in relation to IS. We found that 
employees at the university anchor their IS values in their professional values. Employees at the two 
departments emphasized similar values that were in agreement with professional values of their 
academic profession. For instance we found that university employees anchor their use of the work 
computer for private business in the „academic freedom‟ value system. This finding is in line with 
other studies showing that security cultures differ between professions (Vast 2007; Guzman, Stam et 
al. 2008; Ramachandran, Rao et al. 2008). Based on our findings showing that professional values 
influence the view of IS, we argue that professional values should be considered when security culture 
is cultivated in an organization. On the other hand, we found that IT-professionals at the different 
departments held different values in relation to IS. Therefore we cannot conclude that IT-
professionals at the investigated university belong to a homogenous professional group sharing 
similar values. This finding is inconsistent with earlier studies that show that IT-professionals 
belonging to the same profession share the same values even if they do not work for the same 
organization (Guzman, Stam et al. 2008). We think that this inconsistence depends on the type of 
organization we study. In an academic environment values of freedom and autonomy are emphasized 
as important and these values influence even IT-professionals work in this environment (Kolkowska 
2006). According to the university‟s IS Manager, the differences between IT environments at the 
university - in terms of variation and decentralization, and the difference in IS strategies and goals - 
are due to different cultures within the departments. Hence this study found that different security 
subcultures exist within the very same organization. 1) We found different security subcultures at the 
two studied departments due to a decentralized and diversified organization where different 
departments have different security requirements. 2) We found also different security cultures 
between different groups at the same department. We therefore conclude by arguing that it is 
meaningful to cultivate different security cultures within the same organization even though the 
majority of literature on security culture argues for the development of a strong security culture at the 
organizational level.  
Second we found value conflicts between values related to IS in between different subcultures in an 
organization. The consequence of the identified value conflicts was an insufficient level of IS at both 
departments. Two different IS management styles were found at the two departments and for that 
reason the value conflicts identified at the two departments differed.  
IS management at department two had a technical focus. Such focus has been criticized in the IS 
literature and termed as „technically skewed‟ for a largely socio-technical problem (Hedström, 
Dhillon et al. 2010). Value conflicts identified at the department were found both between the 
espoused values and between basic assumptions. IT-professionals‟ values and beliefs grounded in the 
technical perspective and related to how IS should be handled at the department came in conflict with 
users‟ professional values and basic assumptions. This resulted in dissatisfaction among users and 
also in conscious violation of IS policies and measures. In a free and uncontrolled organization such 
as the university there were many such possibilities.  IS management at department one is in line with 
socio-organizational perspective (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000). We did not identify any value 
conflicts between espoused values. It was probably because IT-professionals at this department 
emphasized that IS management should support the organisational values. The users at this 
department were satisfied and willing to cooperate in IS issues. However, we found value conflicts 
between basic assumptions held by IT-professionals and users. These value conflicts led to 
insufficient level of security at the department and to unrealized expectations between these two 
groups. Based on this finding we argue that it is important to make basic assumptions visible and to 
highlight value conflicts between different groups. We suggest that these value conflicts can be used 
as a starting point for development of an IS culture that brings together expectations of different 
groups within an organization.  
The third finding is that basic assumptions do not always support espoused values. This means that 
implemented security structures and processes are not in line with security values emphasized in 
relation to IS. We found such inconsistencies at both the studied departments. We argue that it is 
important that values espoused by people responsible for IS are in agreement with their basic 
assumptions for two reasons. First users get confused if implemented IS initiatives are not in line with 
IS values that are emphasized as important. Second it is important that IS managers are aware of what 
values guide their work with IS. It is stressed in the literature that management‟s values and beliefs 
are important in designing and implementing IS policies and rules (Hsu 2009). If managers do not 
understand the reasons behind an IS policy or do not fully support the rationale behind the strategy 
they are unlikely to engage in its development and implementation and they do not adhere to it later 
causing confusion among the users (Hirsch and Ezingeard 2008).  
Four, we found our theoretical model based on Shein‟s model is useful analysis of values and value 
conflicts in context of security culture. The model gave us a good support in data collection and 
analysis. According to the literature, the study of values within an organization can be complicated by 
the fact that some values are hidden and unconscious (Kluckhohn 1951; Mumford 1981). Shein‟s 
model supports identification of both espoused values and unconscious values (basic assumptions). 
Basic assumptions are identified by focusing on behaviours and visible structures and processes 
(artifacts). Because the model is divided in three distinct levels it is possible to make comparisons 
between different cultures on these three levels. In our case study it was helpful to understand if value 
conflicts appeared on espoused value level or on basic assumptions level. A study which only looks at 
espoused values can be misleading because people do not always act according to what they say 
(Schein 1999). In our study we used the model for two kinds of comparisons 1) espoused values and 
basic assumptions within the same subculture (vertical comparison in Shein‟s model) and 2) espoused 
values as well as basic assumptions were compared between different subcultures (horizontal 
comparison in Shein‟s model). We found the model helpful in finding value conflicts in these two 
kinds of analysis. The limitation of the model is that it does not really support how the basic 
assumptions can be derived from the identified artefacts. In our study we have complement the model 
for this purpose with Kluckhohn‟s (1951) recommendation of identifying values from actions and 
words. Based on this recommendation in our analysis we focused on 1) actions or words that express 
approval or disapproval 2) actions intending to achieve a certain goal or result. We argue that 
Klouckholm‟s theory is a valuable complement to shein‟s model.  
6 Conclusion 
Users‟ lack of compliance with IS policies and rules is considered a major problem within this area 
today. According to the literature developing an organizational security culture might contribute to 
improvement of compliance with IS policies. This study suggests that analysis of value conflicts can 
be used as a starting point for development of IS culture that is aligned with organizational and 
professional values and brings together expectations of different stakeholders within an organization. 
In this article we highlighted and analysed value conflicts related to IS between users and IT 
professionals within an academic environment. We found that employees at the university anchor 
their values related to IS in their professional values and also that there are different security 
subcultures within the same organization.  
We would like to point out that the value conflicts identified in this study are context-specific and 
cannot be generalized beyond the academic domain. Value conflicts found in this specific context 
might be different from an industry setting. Therefore the key limitation of this study is that the 
findings are based on one case study in an academic environment. However, the study was of 
explorative character and our purpose was to bring to light the importance of understanding value 
conflicts between different groups in creating of an information security culture. We believe that our 
empirical results highlight value conflicts as an important factor to take into account when security 
culture is cultivated in an organization. 
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